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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
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jurisdiction over this appeal, pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(J) and -4, Utah, Code.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
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Issue No. 1 was preserved for appeal at R. 3716-3848.
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iHC to obtain informed consent from Plaintiff,'"

Standard of Review
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interpretation T i ^l.:Uir pieseots a question HH~w -^hich the appeluiie ecrir* reviews for
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Department oj 7 i an sj )Of tation v Ivers, 2009 UT 56. ( | 9 . Also, the jpnellate court reviews
a trial court's ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness, viewing the facts
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and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, f 6, 177 P.3d 600.
Issue No. 2 was preserved for appeal at R. 3716-3848.
3. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment to IHC by concluding
that IHC did not assume a legal duty of care when it acknowledged a duty to obtain informed
consent, and decided to obtain informed consent from parents of children on whom IHC
proposed to use an experimental, sales demo ventilator? Standard of Review: The
determination of a legal duty is a question of law. The appellate court reviews a trial court's
legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness, viewing
the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, f 6, 177 P.3d 600.
Issue No. 3 was preserved for appeal at R. 3716-3848.
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
Utah Code Ann, § 78B-3-406(l)
For a patient to recover damages from a health care provider in an action based upon
the provider's failure to obtain informed consent, the patient must prove the following:
(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed between the patient and health care
provider;
(b) the health care provider rendered health care to the patient;
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries arising out of the health care rendered;
(d) the health care rendered carried with it a substantial and significant risk of
causing the patient serious harm;
(e) the patient was not informed of the substantial and significant risk;
(f) a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would not have consented
to the health care rendered after having been fully informed as to all facts
relevant to the decision to give consent; and
(g) the unauthorized part of the health care rendered was the proximate cause of
personal injuries suffered by the patient.

Utah Code Ann, § 78B-3-403Q2)
"Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, association, corporation, or other
facility or institution who causes to be rendered or who renders health care or professional
services as a hospital, health care facility, physician, registered nurse, licensed practical
nurse, nurse-midwife, licensed Direct-entry midwife, dentist, dental hygienist, optometrist,
clinical laboratory technologist, pharmacist, physical therapist, physical therapist assistant,
podiatric physician, psychologist, chiropractic physician, naturopathic physician, osteopathic
physician, osteopathic physician and surgeon, audiologist, speech-language pathologist,
clinical social worker, certified social worker, social service worker, marriage and family
counselor, practitioner of obstetrics, or others rendering similar care and services relating to
or arising out of the health needs of persons or groups of persons and officers, employees,
or agents of any of the above acting in the course and scope of their employment.

-3-
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
One-year-old Derek Nguyen died when IHC personnel, contrary to the rules
of Primary Children's Medical Center ("PCMC" or "the hospital") and without parental
consent, attached Derek to an untested, sales-demo ventilator; the sales-demo malfunctioned,
and Derek suffocated. Derek's father, the plaintiff, sued, inter alia, for failure to obtain
informed consent. In decision filed April 22, 2010, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's entry of summary judgment, holding that all Defendants, including IHC, were
subject to liability for failure to obtain informed consent See, Nguyen v. IHC Health
Services, Inc., 2010 UT App. 85.
After remand, IHC moved, once again, for summary judgment on its failure to
obtain informed consent, re-asserting the identical "no legal duty of care" argument that it
had argued before the Utah Court of Appeals. Plaintiff moved, under the law of the case
doctrine, to strike IHC's reasserted motion for summary judgment, which the trial court
denied. The court entertained IHC s reasserted argument and reversed the ruling of the court
of appeals in Nguyen. Plaintiff then petitioned for interlocutory review of the trial court's
ruling, and the petition was granted on April 14, 2011.

-4-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On April 22, 2010, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its decision in

Nguyen v. IHC Health Services, Inc., 2010 UT App. 85, reversing the summary judgment of
the trial court and holding Defendant IHC Health Services, Inc., dba Primary Children's
Medical Center (hereafter "IHC"), subject to liability for failing to obtain informed consent.
See,Nguyen,ffl,
2.

16-19.
During the appeal, Defendant IHC argued to the court of appeals that

it owed no legal duty of care to obtain informed consent from Plaintiff when it used and
tested a sales-demo ventilator on his one-year-old son, Derek Nguyen. See, Addendum 2,
R. 3742-3746, pp. 28-31; Addendum 3, R. 3748-3753, pp. 10-14.
3.

After remand, Defendant IHC filed, once again, a motion for summary

judgment, asserting the same "no legal duty of care to obtain informed consent" argument
which it had presented to the Utah Court of Appeals. See, R. 3563-3715.
4.

Plaintiff moved to strike Defendants' reasserted motion for summary

judgment, under the law of the case doctrine, but the trial court denied the motion to strike.
See, R. 3716-3848; Addendum 1, R. 5837-5840.
5.

Derek Nguyen suffocated and died after IHC s employees attached him

to an untested, sales-demo ventilator, which IHC was considering for purchase. R. 3514-15,
92:4-98:7; R. 1246-48,103:7-113:10, R. 1263,109:17-23; R. 1272, 42:7-14.

-5-
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6.

IHC was considering the sales-demo for purchase as a life-flight

transport ventilator, and it was in the hospital for testing and evaluation purposes only, not
for patient care. R. 1263, 109:17-231272, 42:7-14.
7.

IHC s employees and agents were subject to rules governing use of the

sales-demo while it was in the hospital, including that they were not to use it on any
critically-ill or medically-unstable children; also, that parental informed consent would have
to be obtained before using it on a child. R. 1262, 86:15-87:7; R. 1277,58:7-17; R. 1331-32,
131:17-132:4; R. 1367-68, 121:13-123:1, R. 1291-93, 75:17-77:14.
8.

Derek Nguyen was critically ill and medically unstable, and IHC s

employees and agents did not obtain informed consent from Derek's father to attach him to
the sales-demo ventilator. R. 1264, 120:9-121:7; R. 3514, 92:4-17;R. 1277, 58:11-17; R.
3502-03, 44:21-45:8; R.1288, 71:21-25.
9.

Earlier in the same day that IHC' s employees and agents attached Derek

to the sales-demo, it was scheduled for testing in the hospital's pediatric intensive care unit
("PICU"). R. 1272, 41:16-42:14, R. 1243, 85:14-87:14.
10.

At the time of the scheduled testing, IHC s employees and agents were

unable to test the sales-demo on moderately-ill, stable children, since there were apparently
no such children available in the PICU that day. R. 1243, 85:14-86:2; R. 1271, 39:2-18.
11.

IHCs employees and agents that decided to use the sales model on

Derek included IHC employee Tammy Bleak, an IHC life-flight nurse and chairperson of the

-6-
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IHC committee assigned to test, evaluate, and acquire a new life-flight transport ventilator,
and Madeline Witte, M.D., a member of IHC' s committee and Director of Primary Children's
Medical Center ("PCMC") life-flight program. R. 1237, 51:7-9, 33:19-41:10, 22:18-24,
23:3-4, 14:3-21, 19:2-7. Additional IHC employees assigned to the committee by Tammy
Bleak and who used the sales model and/or allowed the sales model to be used on Derek
Nguyen were several neo-natal life-flight nurses, including Kathy Bolte, IHC respiratory
therapist Kevin Crezee, and IHC clinical engineer Ramsey Worman. R. 1233-35, 33:1941:10.
12.

In addition to holding chair of the committee, IHC employee Tammy

Bleak was IHC's Children's Services Equipment Specialist. R. 1226-27,8:9-9:2, R. 123335, 33:19-41:10, R. 1237,51:7-9.
13.

Tammy Bleak admitted, that as IHCs Children's Services Equipment

Specialist, she had the duty to ensure reliability of the sales-demo ventilator through
completion of the testing and evaluation process (called the CTM process), before allowing
its use on a patient outside the testing and evaluation parameters. R. 1242,72:10-73:18; R.
1231-32, 24:24-31:21; R. 1232, 29:23-30:5, R. 1233, 33:13-15.
14.

At the time of Derek Nguyen's admission at PCMC, Dr. Witte was

PCMC s Medical Director of Pediatric Life-Flight, for which she was paid $20,000 per year;
she reported to PCMC's Medical Director of Life-Flight Services and to an IHC
administrator, and she spent all of her work time at PCMC, eighty-five to ninety percent on

-7-
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clinical practice at PCMC, and the other ten to fifteen percent in performing her duties as
PCMC's Medical Director of Pediatric Life-Flight. R. 3808-3809, pp. 21:18-25:18.
15.

As Medical Director of Pediatric Life-Flight at PCMC, Dr. Witte

reviewed patient-care practices provided by the life-flight team, provided education for the
flight teams, reviewed the flights of the flight team, and performed all other services that
PCMC reasonably asked of her. Id.
16.

Dr. Witte worked at PCMC for at least sixteen-and-a-half years, and did

not tell patients that she is not an employee of IHC or PCMC. Id.
17.

Derek Nguyen, as a patient in the PICU at PCMC was assigned a multi-

disciplinary health-care team, and Dr. Witte was one of the physicians on that team. R. 1264,
118:16-18; R. 1257, 50:23-52:21; R. 1258, 61:3-16; R. 1245,99:7-23.
18.

Shortly after it appeared that the clinical evaluation could not proceed,

Tammy Bleak and Dr. Witte decided to use, and the other IHC employees listed above,
agreed to use the sales-demo, in violation of the hospital rules, to transport Derek for a CT
scan, from the PICU to the radiology department on another floor of the hospital. R. 1243,
85:14-86:16; R. 1245, 97:3-104:13.
19.

Dr. Witte called Tammy Bleak, indicating that they could use the sales-

demo on Derek Nguyen. R. 1243, 87:15-88:3; R. 1255, 42:15-43:25. Tammy Bleak
testified:

-8-
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Q:

Okay. Do you know why Dr. Witte called you? Did you
have possession of the ventilators which were to be
clinically evaluated?

A:

She would have-I don't recall if I had possession. She
would have called me because I was over the committee,
so I could mobilize whatever we needed.

Q:

Meaning you could mobilize-you lost me there. What
could you mobilize?

A:

As I told you earlier, I was the one who had contact with
the vendors, with Paul, so she would have called me as
the chair of the committee to say, we have a patient we
could use this on. That's why I was called.

R. 1243, 87:15-88:3. (emphasis added).
20.

IHC s employees and agents used Derek Nguyen to test the sales-demo

ventilator. R. 1245, 98:9-100:17; R. 1247,107:11-108:16, R. 1243, 87:10-14, R. 3249.
21.

IHC personnel assigned to test and evaluate the sales-demo ventilator

gathered to observe the sales-demo on Derek. R. 1244-45,94:8-100:17, R. 1233, 34:10-23;
R. 1234,40:3-10.
22.

Paul Astle, the sales-demo vendor, attended to answer any questions

IHC s officers, employees, and agents had, as they used the sales-demo to on Derek Nguyen.
Id.
23.

IHCs officers, employees, and agents knew, given Derek's condition,

that he could not tolerate even a brief interruption in his ventilation, and they were aware that
the sales-demo ventilator was untested and could fail. R. 1263,112:10-12; R. 1264,120:5-

-9-
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11; R. 1261, 82:23-84:15; R. 1243, 86:8-11, 87:10-14; R. 1247,108:17-25; R. 1269,25:1118.
24.

Dr. Witte opined that the interruption in Derek's ventilation from failure

of the sales-demo led to significant deterioration, from which Derek was not able to recover,
and, as a result, he died. R. 1264, 120:5-9.
25.

Ramsey Worman, a member of the CTM committee and a clinical

engineer at PCMC, testified that he felt that IHC had not fulfilled its duty of care with regard
to inspecting and ensuring reliability of the sales demo before using it on a sick patient. R.
1372, 42:15-49:24. He disagreed with the hospital's decision to test it on any patients, let
alone critically-ill patients. Id.
26.

Before using the sales-demo on Derek Nguyen, IHC's employees and

agents had never previously used it to transport anyone, nor even attached it to any patient,
let alone to transport a critically-ill, medically-unstable child, and had not even given the
sales-demo a trial run to see if it would function properly on a trip between the PICU and the
radiology department. R. 1247, 108:17-25.
27.

At the time of Derek Nguyen's admission, IHC had a "patient and

family rights," posted and in effect at the hospital, stating,
Primary Children's Medical Center is dedicated to meeting your health
care needs, and to treating you and your child with the respect and
consideration you deserve.
You and your child have the following rights:

-10-
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•

To participate in your child's plan of care and other
decisions about your child's health care, including how to
manage your child's plan.

•

To be told if any proposed treatment is for the purpose of
research, and to be able to consent or refuse to participate
without your decision affecting your child's care.

•

To be informed of hospital rules that apply to you and your
child.

R. 3847-3848. (emphasis added).
29.

Prior to transporting Derek via the sales demo, IHC's employees and

agents did not inform Derek's father that the ventilator was a sales demo, that it was in the
hospital for testing, that hospital rules prohibited its use on a patient in Derek's condition,
that it had never previously been used to transport anyone, attached to anyone, nor even taken
on a trial run; nor did they inform Derek's father that, given Derek's condition, he was
unlikely to survive a malfunction of the sales demo. R. 3514, 92:4-17.
30.

During transport, the untested sales demo malfunctioned and, as a result,

Derek died. R. 1246-48, 103:7-113:10, R. 1264,120:5-9.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Reversing the first summary judgment entered by the trial court, in Nugyen v.
IHC Health Services, Inc., 2010 UT App. 85, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that IHC is
subject to liability to Plaintiff for failing to obtain informed consent when it experimentally
used a sales-demo ventilator on his son. After remand, contrary to the law of the case and
the mandate of the court of appeals, the trial court reversed the court of appeals' ruling, after
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

entertaining a second motion for summary judgment from IHC. This second summary
judgment motion reasserted the identical "no legal duty" argument considered and rejected
by the court of appeals. The trial court had no authority to entertain IHC's reasserted
argument, nor to reverse the ruling of the court of appeals. The court of appeals should
reverse

the

trial

court

again,

enforcing

its

mandate

from

Nguyen.

The court of appeals inNguyen quoted Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-406( 1), which
imposes a legal duty upon health care providers to obtain informed consent. IHC is a health
care provider, as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-406(l). IHC, by and through its
officers, employees, and agents, used the sales-demo ventilator on Derek Nguyen and owed
Plaintiff a duty to obtain informed consent.
In the event the court of appeals decides to reconsider its rulings in Nguyen,
the court should not only hold IHC to its statutorily imposed legal duty, but should also find
that IHC assumed a legal duty to obtain informed consent. IHC represented to parents that
they had the right to be informed of and decline care, including experimental care. Also, IHC
specifically decided to seek and obtain informed consent from parents upon whose children
they proposed to use the sales demo ventilator.

-12-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADHERE TO THE LAW OF
THE CASE BY REVERSING THE RULING OF THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS.
In Nguyen v. IHC Health Services, Inc., 2010 UT App. 85, the Utah Court of
Appeals ruled that IHC is subject to liability to Plaintiff for failing to obtain informed
consent when it experimentally used a sales-demo ventilator on Plaintiff's son. Nguyen, at
H 1,16-19. The court of appeals thus reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment.
Id. After remand, the trial court reversed the ruling of the court of appeals, entering summary
judgment, for a second time, of Plaintiff s claim that IHC failed to obtain informed consent.
See, Addendum 1. In so acting, the trial court violated the law of the case. The Utah Court
of Appeals should reverse the trial court again, upholding the law of the case.
The law of the case doctrine holds that rulings by an appellate court bind a
lower court, and on remand must be obeyed. See e.g., Gilda v. Guardian Title Company of
Utah, 2001 UT 75 f 9, Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1995)
("Thurston IF). In Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165 (Utahl992) {^'Thurston T),
the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of defendant
Box Elder County, and remanded for a determination of whether the County violated the
County Personnel Management Act ("the Act") when making its decision to terminate
plaintiff Thurston's employment. Thurston II, at 1035,1036. While on remand, the County

-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sought to introduce evidence that it was not bound by the Act, because the Act was optional
for counties with fewer than 130 employees. Id., at 1037. The trial court, however, refused
to consider the argument, stating that Thurston /, which was the law of the case, mandated
the County's compliance with the Act. Id. The trial court then ruled that the County had
improperly considered factors beyond those enumerated in the Act in terminating plaintiff
Thurston. Id., at 1036. On a second appeal to the supreme court, the County argued that
evidence proffered at trial was uncontroverted that the County was not subject to the Act
when it terminated Thurston, and that the the trial court erred by ignoring it. Id. The
supreme court disagreed, explaining that the law of the case precluded the trial court from
considering the county's evidence:
The County's argument is without merit. The trial court ruled that the
County was bound to follow the Act because Thurston I so held "and
that is the law of the case and is binding." The trial court was
precluded from considering the Act's applicability by reason of the law
of the case and properly refused to consider the County's evidence on
that issue.
The "law of the case" is a legal doctrine under which a decision made
on an issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of
the same litigation. The doctrine was developed in the interest of
economy and efficiency to avoid the delays and difficulties involved in
repetitious contentions and reconsideration of rulings on matters
previously decided in the same case.
Law of the case terminology has been applied to a number of distinct
sets of problems, each with a separate analysis. One branch of the
doctrine, often called the mandate rule, dictates that pronouncements
of an appellate court on legal issues in a case become the law of the
case and must be followed in subsequent proceedings of that case.
The lower court must not depart from the mandate, and any change
with respect to the legal issues governed by the mandate must be
made by the appellate court that established it or by a court to which
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it, in turn, owes obedience. In addition, the lower court must
implement both the letter and the spirit of the mandate, taking into
account the appellate court's opinion and the circumstances it
embraces.
The application of the mandate rule lacks the flexibility found in other
branches of the law of the case doctrine. The mandate must be
followed even though the lower court subsequently addressing the
issue may believe that the issue could have been better decided in
another fashion. This serves the dual purpose ofprotecting against
the reargument of settled issues and of assuring adherence of lower
courts to the decisions of higher courts.
Thurston II, at 1037-38. (citations omitted, emphasis added).
Like in Thurston II, in the matter at bar, the trial court was obligated to adhere
to the law of the case established by the court of appeals' decision in Nguyen, even though
the trial court believed that the issue "could have been better decided in another fashion".
The mandate to the trial court from Nguyen was that IHC is subject to liability to Plaintiff for
failure to obtain informed consent. Nguyen, at fK 1, 16-19. On remand, it was not for the
trial court to ignore that mandate and take up the issue of whether IHC owed a legal duty to
Plaintiff. Note that in Thurston II, even where uncontroverted evidence was proferred to the
trial court that the Act did not apply, since the supreme court had already remanded for a
determination of whether the County had violated the terms of the Act, the issue of whether
it applied became moot. Likewise, in the case at bar, since the court of appeals ruled that
IHC is subject to liability, the issue of whether IHC owed Plaintiff a legal duty was not an
issue for trial court consideration.
As directed by the supreme court in Thurston II, in the matter at bar the trial
court was to implement "both the letter and the spirit of the mandate, taking into account the
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appellate court's opinion and the circumstances it embraces". Id. Those circumstances
include the fact that an appellate court reviews entry of summary judgment de novo, and
considers any grounds presented to uphold entry of summary judgment.

White v.

Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371,1376 (Utah 1994). During the first appeal, IHC presented, and
the court of appeals considered the identical "no duty of care" argument that IHC reasserted
in moving, once again, for summary judgment after remand. See, R. 3716-3848; Addenda
2 and 3.
Further, the language of the opinion demonstrates that the court of appeals
viewed IHC as owing a legal duty, since it held that no expert testimony was required to
establish the standard of care applicable to IHC's legal duty. After citing Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-3-406(l), which establishes a health care provider's legal duty to obtain informed
consent, the court of appeals explained why no expert testimony was required to establish the
standard of care:
[I]n this case, Nguyen bases his claim not on perceived
deficiencies in the disclosures made, but on the complete absence of
any disclosure about the untested nature of the ventilator and the
risks of its use. If Nguyen's theory had been that disclosures were
made to him but the disclosures were misstated or did not include
material information, such as the fact that FDA approval was relatively
recent or that there was a possibility a screw might come loose and
cause the ventilator to malfunction, then it may well be that Nguyen
would need an expert to establish exactly what information he was
entitled to have disclosed to him. See Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 821 n.4.
Instead, Nguyen claims that he was entitled to know one basic fact,
the obvious importance of which does not require an expert to
explain-i.e., that this ventilator was unproven and was being tested
by the hospital to determine if it should be purchased.
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An expert is not needed to establish that Nguyen should have
been informed that the ventilator was in the hospital on a trial basis
for experimental purposes; that it was still under evaluation; that it
was actually intended for "life flight" transport; andy most
importantlyy that the ventilator had not once been used on a patient.
Cf. Id. at 352 ("[Ejxpert testimony is unnecessary to establish the
standard of care owed the plaintiff where the propriety of the treatment
received is within the common knowledge and experience of the
layman. The loss of a surgical instrument or other paraphernalia, in the
operating site, exemplifies this type of treatment.")
Id., %f 17, 18. (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). The court also noted that
Defendant IHC gave Plaintiff some "general information about the need for Derek to be
transported to receive a CT scan and 'that there was a risk involved with this process' . . .
[h]owever, it appears even from Defendants' account that no information was given to
Nguyen regarding the fact that the ventilator was not regular hospital equipment and that
it was being tested by PCMC so it could evaluate whether the ventilator should be
purchased. Id., n. 9. (emphasis added). The court then reversed the grant of summary
judgment, finding "a total absence of any disclosure about the ventilator's experimental
status" and determining that no expert testimony was required to establish the standard of
care. A/., 118.
Thus, the letter and spirit of the court of appeals' mandate, especially
considering the circumstances of the appeal and the language of the opinion, did not open
the door for the trial court to reconsider IHC's argument. Nevertheless, the trial court
justified its entertainment of IHC s reasserted argument, on the basis of the court of appeals'
statement that the trial court's "'sole rationale . . . for granting summary judgment was the
absence of expert testimony.'" See, Addendum 1, p. 2, f 2. This argument, however, is a
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non-sequitur and inconsistent with the mandate rule of the law of the case doctrine. The fact
that the court of appeals noted the trial court's sole basis for summary judgment does not
mean that the court of appeals sole consideration in reversing summary judgment was the fact
that no expert testimony was necessary. Again, on appeal in Nguyen, IHC argued not only
the expert testimony issue, but the legal duty issue. See, Addenda 2 and 3. Also,
conspicuously absent from Nguyen is any statement by the court of appeals directing the
lower court to address, on remand, whether IHC owes a legal duty of care. Customarily,
appellate court decisions explicitly direct lower courts to address specific issues presented
on appeal, that the appellate court defers to the lower court to address. Such was not the case
here. Rather than seek a way around the ruling, the trial court should have honored the
mandate of the court of appeals.
Of course, as the supreme court went on to explain in Thurston II, the law of
the case doctrine does not mean that a considered issue cannot be raised again, only that it
would have to be raised through a petition for rehearing before the appellate court, not on
remand to the trial court:
By the foregoing, we do not suggest that a decision of this Court may
never be reconsidered. Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure provides a mechanism whereby a party may petition this
court for rehearing. The County did not petition for rehearing of
Thurston I. The County was thus bound by the decision of Thurston I
on remand of this case in all further proceedings below.
Thurston II, at 1037-38.
In the case at bar, if IHC really believed that the Utah Court of Appeals had
ignored its "no duty of care" argument, then IHC had the opportunity to petition the court of
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appeals for rehearing. However, IHC chose not to petition for rehearing, rather it chose to
wait to reassert its argument at the lower court level, where it had previously found success.
This is precisely the type of maneuver the law of the case doctrine prohibits, to "avoid the
delays and difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and reconsideration of rulings on
matters previously decided in the same case." Thurston II, at 1037. Because it failed to
petition the court of appeals for rehearing, IHC is bound by the decision in Nguyen in all
subsequent proceedings.
The supreme court in Thurston II did identify a second way in which an
appellate decision may be reconsidered:
In addition, under limited circumstances a court may reconsider its own
prior decision. While the County does not identify reconsideration of
Thurston I as an issue on this appeal, in essence that is what the County
seeks. In its brief the county states, "Because that evidence was
uncontroverted, this Court is free to, and should, render the legal
determination that the [Act] did not govern Thurston's termination."

Id., at 1038. However, the supreme court, while recognizing that "Thurston /overstated the
applicability of the Act to the County's personnel policies and procedures," declined to
reconsider its ruling, for reasons of efficiency and consistency. Thurston II, at 1038-39. For
these same reasons, the court of appeals should decline to reconsider its prior decision in
Nguyen.1

Should the court of appeals decide to reconsider its ruling in Nguyen, then Plaintiff
would anticipate and respectfully request that the court reconsider all of its rulings, including
its dismissal of Plaintiffs other causes of action. See, e.g., Judge Thome's dissent in Nguyen
at <H 21-26.
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The trial court failed to adhere to the law of the case in reversing the ruling of
the Utah Court of Appeals in Nguyen. The court of appeals should now, again, reverse the
trial court, upholding the mandate of Nguyen that IHC is subject to liability to Plaintiff for
failing to obtain informed consent.
POINT II
THE UTAH CODE ESTABLISHES THAT IHC OWED
PLAINTIFF A LEGAL DUTY TO OBTAIN INFORMED
CONSENT.
Even were the court of appeals to reconsider its ruling in Nguyen, as
demonstrated in the first appeal, Utah law establishes that IHC owed Plaintiff a legal duty
to obtain informed consent. See, Addendum 3. In ruling that IHC was subject to liability in
Nguyen, the court quoted from the Utah Code, which establishes the duty of a "health care
provider" to obtain informed consent. See, Nguyen, n. 8 and \\6., Utah Code Ann. §78B-3406(1). The Code defines "Health care provider" as follows:
(12) "Health care provider" includes any person, partnership,
association, corporation, or other facility or institution who causes to
be rendered or who renders health care or professional services as a
hospital, health care facility . . . and officers, employees, or agents of
any of the above acting in the course and scope of their employment.
Utah Code §78B-3-403(12). (emphasis added). Thus, by its plain language, the Utah Code
establishes that IHC Health Services Inc., dba Primary Children's Medical Center, is a health
care provider that owes a legal duty of care to obtain informed consent for health care or
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professional services it renders or causes to be rendered in its facility, including that rendered
or caused to be rendered by IHC's officers, employees, or agents.2
The evidence in the case, especially when viewed in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff, as it must be, demonstrates that IHC, by and through its officers, employees, and
agents rendered health care or professional services and caused health care or professional
services to be rendered to Derek Nguyen. Nurse Tammy Bleak, who arranged for the salesdemo ventilator to be used on Derek, was IHC s employee and officer. She was head of the
CTM committee charged with testing and evaluating the sales-demo ventilator. She was also
IHC's Children's Services Equipment Specialist, with the admitted duty of ensuring
reliability of the sales-demo ventilator through completion of the CTM testing and evaluation
process, prior to allowing its use on Derek.
Nurse Bleak staffed the CTM committee with other IHC medical personnel and
together they established rules for use of the sales-demo, including that it would not be used
on critically-ill or unstable patients, and that parents would have to give their informed
consent, before IHC used it on their children. She and the entire CTM committee recognized
their duty to inform parents about use of the sales-demo on their children and arranged for
an informed consent document to be drafted. After Nurse Bleak arranged for use of the
sales-demo on Derek, IHC employee and committee member Kevin Crezee then hooked
Contrary to the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-406(l) and §78B-3403(12), the trial court ruled, "Utah Code 78B-3-406 does not create an independent duty on
the part of PCMC to obtain informed consent." See, Addendum 1, p. 2, \ 3. The trial court
thus has ignored the plain language of the statute, and substituted its will for that of the Utah
Legislature.
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Derek up to the sales-demo and he and other IHC employees transported Derek on the salesdemo, while the CTM committee members observed. Kevin Crezee, Ramsey Worman,
Kathy Bolte and all the IHC nurses on the committee and involved in using and allowing use
of the sales-demo on Derek Nguyen, knew the experimental status and the rules governing
use of the sales demo. Their knowledge and conduct also obligated IHC to obtain informed
consent.
Ignoring the fact that Derek could not have been attached to the sales demo
without Nurse Tammy Bleaks' approval, as well as the participation of other IHC committee
members, the trial court was misled by IHC s incorrect argument that the law imposed a legal
duty only upon Derek's attending physician, Madeline Witte, M.D. Yet, even arriving at this
erroneous conclusion, the trial court also had to ignore the fact that Dr. Witte was IHC's
officer, employee, and/or agent. As presented to the trial court (and to the court of appeals
on the first appeal), and set forth again above, Dr. Witte was IHC's Medical Director of
Pediatric Life-Flight, the department for which she and IHC's other employees were testing
and evaluating the sales-demo ventilator. IHC paid Dr. Witte $20,000 per year in this
position. Dr. Witte was also a member of the CTM committee charged with testing and
evaluating the sales-demo. The committee tasked Dr. Witte with drawing up the informed
consent release for parental signature. Thus, even if one were to assume that no one but Dr.
Witte was involved in attaching Derek to the sales-demo ventilator, IHC would still owe a
duty of informed consent, since the evidence shows that Dr. Witte IHC's officer, employee,
and/or agent.
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Having been presented with IHC' s legal duty arguments and the facts regarding
the conduct of IHC's officers, employees, and agents, the court of appeals understood the
situation, the first time around, in ruling that IHC was subject to liability for failing to obtain
informed consent. Pursuant to the Utah Code, IHC owed Plaintiff a legal duty to obtain
informed consent.
POINT III
IHC ALSO ASSUMED A LEGAL DUTY TO OBTAIN
INFORMED CONSENT.
In addition to its statutorily imposed legal duty, IHC should be held to have
assumed a legal to obtain informed consent. IHC published and posted a Patient Bill of
Rights at Primary Children's Medical Center, telling parents that it owed them a duty to
obtain informed consent:
Primary Children's Medical Center is dedicated to meeting your health
care needs, and to treating you and your child with the respect and
consideration you deserve.
You and your child have the following rights:
•

To participate in your child9s plan of care and other
decisions about your child9s health care, including how
to manage your child9splan.

•

To be told if any proposed treatment is for the purpose
of research, and to be able to consent or refuse to
participate without your decision affecting your child's
care.

•

To be informed of hospital rules that apply to you and
your child.
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R. 3847-3848. (emphasis added). True to IHC's representation to parents, the CTM
committee decided it had an obligation to obtain informed consent prior to attaching children
to the sales-demo ventilator, and assigned committee member Dr. Witte the task of drafting
the informed consent document.
Courts have imposed a legal duty on hospitals where they have represented
owing a duty of care or decided to obtain informed consent for experimental care. See, e.g.,
Lenahan v. University of Chicago, 808 N.E.2d 1078,1082 - 85 (111. App. 5th 2004) (reversing
summary dismissal where hospital undertook independent duty to obtain informed consent
for clinical trial patients); Friter v. lolab Corp., 607 A.2d 1111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (finding
duty of care where the hospital voluntarily participated in a clinical trial and accepted the
duty to obtain informed consent). See also, Kus v. Sherman Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 1214
(Ill.App. 1995); Stewart v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, 736 N.E.2d 491, 501 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1999); Watkins v. Hosp. of the University ofPenn., 131 A.2d 263, 268 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1999);
The facts at bar show that IHC was conducting a clinical evaluation of an
untested, sales-demo ventilator, and that as part of this evaluation, the hospital imposed on
itself a requirement that informed consent be obtained for any child put on the sales-demo
ventilator. If the trial court's reversal of the court of appeals ruling were allowed to stand,
hospitals could potentially subject their patients to experimental procedures and devices
without obtaining patient informed consent. The court should, therefore, additionally
recognize that IHC assumed a legal duty of care to obtain informed consent.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court failed to follow the law of the case in reversing the Court of
Appeals decision in Nguyen. The Court of Appeals should now enforce its mandate from
Nguyen, reversing the trial court's second entry of summary judgment. The Utah Code,
quoted in Nguyen, imposed a legal duty on IHC to obtain parental consent in using the salesdemo ventilator on Plaintiff's son. Also, IHC assumed a legal duty of care by representing
to parents that it owed such a duty, and by deciding to obtain informed consent to use the
sales-demo.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully requests that the Utah Court of Appeals
again reverse the summary judgment entered by the trial court and remand the case for trial.
DATED AND SUBMITTED this 1st day of August, 2011.

Matthew H. Raty
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JAN 2 8 2011

ROBERT G. WRIGHT [5363]
BRANDON B. HOBBS [8206]
CORTNEY KOCHEVAR [11157]
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON

Attorneys for IHC Health Services, Inc.,
dba Primary Children's Medical Center
Wells Fargo Center, Fifteenth Floor
299 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Email: Robert-Wright@rbmn.com
Brandon-Hobbs@rbmn. com
Cortney-Kochevar@rbmn.com
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

BUU NGUYEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a Utah
Corporation, dba PRIMARY CHILDREN'S
MEDICAL CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF
UTAH HOSPITALS AND CLINICS,
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH and STATE OF
UTAH,

Case No. 030901469
Judge Sandra Peuler

Defendants.
Defendant Primary Children's Medical Center's Motion for Summary Judgment was
heard by the Honorable Sandra Peuler on January 10, 2011. Plaintiff was represented by his
counsel, Matthew H. Raty and Cory B. Mattson. Defendant Primary Children's Medical Center
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("PCMC") was represented by its counsel, Robert G. Wright and Brandon B. Hobbs RICHARDS
BRANDT MILLER NELSON.

The Court, having heard oral argument from the parties, having

reviewed the relevant pleadings, and otherwise being fully advised, hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES the following:
1.

This Court denies Plaintiffs Motion to Strike PCMC's Motion for Summary

Judgment. The law of the case doctrine does not bar this Court from considering Defendant
PCMC's Motion because the Utah Court of Appeals decision in Nguyen v. IHC Health Services,
Inc., did not hold that PCMC had an independent duty to obtain informed consent. The Utah
Court of Appeals' decision to reverse and remand this matter was based upon the fact that this
Court's "sole rationale . . . for granting summary judgment was the absence of expert testimony.
Nguyen v. IHC Health Services, Inc., 2010 UT App. 85, f 18. The Utah Court of Appeals
remanded this case "for trial or such other disposition as may now be proper." Id. Disposition of
this matter pursuant to PCMC's Motion for Summary Judgment is proper, in accordance with
statutory law, case law, and public policy.
2.

Whether PCMC has an independent duty to obtain informed consent is a purely

legal question subject to this Court's determination.
3.

Utah Code 78B-3-406 does not create an independent duty on the part of PCMC

to obtain informed consent.
4.

Defendant PCMC's hospital policies do not establish an independent duty of care

to obtain informed consent.
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5.

(:

Plaintiff has failed to apply the facts of this matter to the law to establish that an

agency or employment relationship existed between Dr. Witte and PCMC. Therefore, there is no
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dr. Witte is an agent or employee of PCMC.
6.

This Court concludes that the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Schaerrer v.

Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 79 P.3d 922 (Utah 2003), is applicable and recognizes a public
policy to protect the privacy and integrity of the physician-patient relationship. Further,
Schaerrer established that imposing a duty to obtain informed consent on a third party would
"have the effect of undermining the physician-patient relationship by engendering fear, doubt,
and second-guessing." Id. at 929 (citations omitted).
7.

The majority of jurisdictions recognize that a hospital does not have an

independent duty to obtain informed consent and the duty to obtain informed consent rests upon
physicians, who actively manage the patient's care. These jurisdictions recognize that imposing
an independent duty upon a hospital to obtain informed consent from a patient unduly interferes
with the physician-patient relationship, has the potential to undermine the physician-patient
relationship, and leads to patient confusion. See Giese v. Stice, 567 N.W.2d 156 (Neb. 1997); see
also Schaerrer, 79 P.3d at 928-929. These jurisdictions also recognize that the treating
physician, rather than hospital staff members, has the education, expertise, skill, and training
necessary to determine what information the patient requires in order to give informed consent.
Id.
8.

This Court concludes that the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Giese v.

Stice, 567 N.W.2d 156 (Neb. 1997) is particularly persuasive. In Geise, the court rejected the
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plaintiffs argument that because the hospital supplied the implants used in the patient's surgeries
the hospital had an independent duty to inform the plaintiff regarding the possible side effects
associated with the implants. The court concluded that the hospital did not have a duty to inform
and to hold otherwise would "constitute an unwarranted interference in the physician-patient
relationship." 7#. at 164.
9.

This Court concludes that, in this matter, Defendant PCMC did not have an

independent duty to obtain informed consent.
10.

Based upon the foregoing conclusions of law, PCMC's Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED.
11.

Plaintiffs claims and causes of action against Defendant IHC Health Services,

Inc., dba Primary Children's Medical Center are dismissed in their entirety with prejudice and on
the merits. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendant IHC Health Services, Inc., dba
Primary Children's Medical Center.

DATED this c^-H

day of January, 2011.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BUU NGUYEN,
Appellant/Plaintiff,
Case No. 20080738
vs.
IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a Utah
Corp., dba PRIMARY CHILDREN'S
MEDICAL CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF
UTAH HOSPITALS AND CLINICS,
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, AND STATE
OF UTAH,
Appellees/Defendants.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE, PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER
Appeal from Final Order from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, Judge Sandra N. Peuler
MATTHEW H.RATY
LAW OFFICES OF MATTHEW H.
RATY, PC
9677 South 700 East, Suite D
Sandy, UT 84070
Telephone: (801) 495-2252
Fax No.: (801)495-2262
Attorney for Appellant

ROBERT G. WRIGHT [5363]
BRANDON B. HOBBS [8206]
ZACHARYE. PETERSON [8502]
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON

Wells Fargo Center, 15th Floor
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P.O. Box 2465
E-mail: robert-wright@rbmn.com
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
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Attorneys for Appellee, PCMC
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The CTM process was completely irrelevant to the decision to transport Derek for
a CT scan. Derek was critically ill, and his condition was deteriorating. Absent some
improvement, Derek was going to die. Dr. Goldenring admitted that he was ignorant of
each of these critical factors, so he used an irrelevant product evaluation protocol to opine
that Dr. Witte, PCMC, and PCMC's staff breached the applicable standard of care. Dr.
Goldenring's testimony is the definition of unreliable, speculative testimony that Rule
702 is designed to preclude.
IV.

PCMC owed no duty to obtain informed consent from Mr. Nguyen.
The trial court properly dismissed Mr. Nguyen's claim for failure to obtain

informed consent. A claim for lack of informed consent is grounded in negligence
principles. See Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d. 188, 193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). To state a
claim for negligence, a plaintiff must establish "(1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a
duty, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the breach of duty was the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, and (4) that the plaintiff in fact suffered injuries
or damages." Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80,1f9, 125 P.3d 906 (citation
omitted). Therefore, in order to maintain a cause of action for lack of informed consent, a
plaintiff is required to establish that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care to
obtain informed consent.
The determination of whether a legal duty exists is a purely legal question that
falls to the court. See Vazdv. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283. The
vast majority of courts refuse to impose a duty to obtain informed consent upon a
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hospital. SeeKrane v. Saint Anthony Hosp. Sys., 738 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that the hospital does not have a duty to obtain informed consent similar to that
which the surgeon is obligated to obtain). Instead, the duty to obtain informed consent is
generally placed upon "those physicians who have actively managed the patient's care."
Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 832 P.2d 797, 799 (N.M. App. 1992) (holding that the
treating physician is in the best position to obtain informed consent from a patient).
In Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck &Co.,a non-employee physician ordered that the
hospital nurses give the patient a blood transfusion. See id, 832 P.2d at 798. The patient
later developed hepatitis, which was traced to the blood transfusion. The patient's estate
sued the hospital for failure to obtain informed consent prior to giving the blood
transfusion. See id. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs complaint for failure to state a
claim for which relief could be granted against the hospital. The New Mexico Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that the hospital did not have duty to
obtain a patient's informed consent for a procedure ordered by a non-employee physician
and performed by hospital employees. See id. at 798-799. In refusing to place a duty to
obtain informed consent on the hospital, the court determined that attending physicians
are more qualified than hospital staff to obtain informed consent. The court's ruling,
thereby, protected the physician-patient relationship from unnecessary third-party
interference.
The Utah Supreme Court has also sought to protect the physician-patient
relationship from third-party interference. In Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy,
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Inc., the plaintiff experienced nausea, chest pains, and dizziness after taking an off-label
prescription of fenfloramine and phentermine (or "fen-phen") for weight loss, as
prescribed by her treating physician. Plaintiff filed a complaint against several
defendants including her pharmacist claiming strict products liability. The trial court
dismissed plaintiffs claims on motions for summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed.
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling and specifically held that
pharmacists are exemptfromstrict products liability for failure to warn of the risks of
prescription drugs. Id. at 1flf20-2l. Under the learned intermediary doctrine, the court
held that
The physician is the best situated to weigh the potential risks
associated with a prescription drug against the possible
benefits of the drug and the unique needs of the patient. The
physician thus has the ability to combine medical knowledge
and training with an individualized understanding of the
patient's needs, and is the best conduit for any warnings that
are deemed necessary.
Id. at ^[21 (citations omitted). The court also recognized that if the court placed a duty
upon pharmacists to warn patients of the potential risks of prescription drugs it would
"have the effect of undermining the physician-patient relationship by engendering fear,
doubt, and second-guessing

Physicians are health care specialists trained to act as

'exclusive intermediaries' in the drug distribution system." Ttf. at ^[21 (citations omitted).
Similarly, this Court should follow the precedent set by the Utah Supreme Court
and the majority of courts to protect the physician-patient relationship by recognizing that
PCMC had no duty to obtain informed consent for treatment prescribed by non-employee
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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physicians. Utah public policy acknowledges that the treating physician is "best situated
to weigh the potential risks . . . the possible benefits . . . and the unique needs of the
patient." Id. at f20. By placing a duty to obtain informed consent on third parties, such as
PCMC, this Court would undermine "the physician-patient relationship by engendering
fear, doubt, and second guessing." Id. at f21.
V.

The trial court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiffs claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages.
a. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
A plaintiff alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress must establish

facts on the record showing the defendant's alleged conduct was "outrageous and
intolerable." Schuurman v. Shingleton, 2001 UT 52, f24,26 P.3d 227,. Essentially,
liability exists only where the conduct is "atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community." Retherfordv. AT&T Commc'ns, 844 P.2d 949, 977-78 n. 19 (Utah 1992)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)). The determination of
whether conduct is "outrageous" is a question of law for the Court to decide. See
Schuurman, 2001 UT 52 at f24.
Utah courts have historically been wary of opening the door to recovery for
emotional distress claims because of their "highly subjective and volatile nature."
Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2001 UT 25, J25, 21 P.3d
198. Accordingly, to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it is
not enough for a plaintiff to show that the defendant intentionally acted in a way that
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c
disregard for the safety of Derek Nguyen and the rights of his father, the plaintiff. Therefore,
the court should reverse the summary judgment of the trial court and remand the claim for
trial.
POINT IV
DEFENDANTS ARE SUBJECT TO LIABILITY FOR FAILING
TO OBTAIN INFORMED CONSENT.
Defendants argue that they should have no duty to disclose to a parent, their
intention to use his critically-ill, unstable child to test a sales-model ventilator, nor to inform
him of the risks associated with that. They also argue that they should have no duty to obtain
parental permission.
Defendant University basis its argument on case law that has no relevance and
does not excuse the University's duty, case law which addresses whether the FDA status of
a medical device need be disclosed. Defendant University also basis its argument on the
assumption that "Dr. Witte's use of the ventilator was outside the scope of the CTM
process." Defendant University's brief, p. 46. That, however, is an issue for jury resolution.
PCMC argues that hospitals generally do not owe a duty of informed consent
and that the duty of informed consent is upon "those physicians who have actively managed
the patient's care." Here, however, PCMC's agent, Dr. Madolin Witte was one of the
physicians actively managing Derek's care and the physician who, along with PCMC's
employee Tammy Bleak, decided to use Derek Nguyen to test the sales-model ventilator. As
an active member of PCMC's CTM committee which established the rules for testing,
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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evaluating, and assessing the reliability of the sales model ventilator, as a paid Medical
Director of Pediatric Life Flights Services for PCMC, and as a clinician practicing
exclusively at PCMC, Dr. Witte was the employee, agent, and/or apparent agent of PCMC.
R. 2372-74,25:6-11,21:18-22:6,23:7-12, 23:21-24:9,24:10-22, 24:23-25:5, 25:12-18, and
26:20-27:3. Dr. Witte's conduct is legally the conduct of PCMC. PCMC, like Defendant
University, is thus vicariously liable for Dr. Witte's failure to obtain informed consent.
PCMC incorrectly asserts that the "vast majority of courts refuse to impose a
duty to obtain informed consent upon a hospital." See PCMC's brief p. 29. The cases cited
by Defendant involve facts where an independent physician has alone ordered or provided
the treatment that gives rise to the cause of action for failure to obtain informed consent.
Utah statutory law, like the law of all jurisdictions, holds hospitals subject to liability for
failure to obtain informed consent for their own treatment decisions. See, Utah Code §78B3-406. The Utah Code recognizes that any "health care provider" owes a legal duty to obtain
informed consent. Id.
PCMC, like Defendant University, was a "health care provider" that made
health care decisions for one-year-old Derek Nguyen, both through its own employees and
through its agent or employee, Madeline Witte, M.D. It thus owed a duty of informed
consent to Derek's father, the plaintiff. In the matter at bar, Defendants PCMC and
University actually recognized their duty to obtain informed consent from the parents of
potential test-subject children, to whom it wanted to attach the sales-model ventilator.
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Defendants PCMC and University assigned their employee or agent, Dr. Witte, with the duty
to prepare the informed consent paper that it would present to parents of children. PCMC
also recognized its legal duty to obtain informed consent, through its policy document titled
"Patient and Family Rights". R. 3146. Under its own declared policies, PCMC had a duty
to allow Plaintiff to participate in his son's health care, to make decisions to accept or refuse
medical care, and to "be told if any proposed treatment is for the purpose of research, and to
be able to consent or refuse to participate . . ." Id. Also, plaintiffs expert witness, Dr.
Goldenring, who has extensive experience and is very familiar with informed consent issues
in hospitals has testified that PCMC had a duty and breached its duty to obtain informed
consent from plaintiff.
Nevertheless, PCMC seeks relief from its duty of informed consent on the
basis of Schaerrer v. Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 2003 UT 43, 79 P.3d 922. In
Schaerrer, the court held that a pharmacist who did not manufacture a drug could not be held
strictly liable under product-liability law for the drug's design defects, nor could he, under
the "learned intermediary rule" be held strictly liable for failing to warn the drug's end-user.
Id. at Tf 15. Under that rule "manufacturers of prescription drugs have a duty to warn only
the physician prescribing the drug, not the end user or patient." Id. at K 20. The court held
that it would be "'incongruous' to impose upon pharmacists a duty to warn patients directly
when the manufacturer did not have a similar duty" and so recognized that a "unique set of
relationships necessitates adoption of the rule exempting pharmacists from strict products

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I :

('

liability for failure to warn of the risks of prescription drugs." Id. at H 21-22. The unique
circumstances included that physicians are "exclusive intermediaries" in the drug distribution
system, pharmacists are limited in their ability to distribute drugs, and like manufacturers,
do not have direct access to patients. Id. The court noted that holding pharmacists strictly
liable to warn patients would undermine the physician-patient relationship by engendering
fear, doubt and second-guessing, and would lead pharmacists to "present patients with
confusing or contradictory information, cast doubt on the propriety of a physician's
legitimate exercise of sound medical judgment, or even refuse to fill valid prescriptions in
an effort to avoid liability." Id. 1 21.
Schaerrer has no application to the case at bar. Plaintiff has asserted no claim
of strict liability against PCMC, nor is PCMC a manufacturer or a pharmacist. The court
made clear that its holding, including extension of the learned intermediary rule to
pharmacists, only applied to strict product liability claims, not to claims of professional
malpractice or negligence, and only to the unique circumstances of manufacturers and
pharmacists. Further, Schaerrer noted specifically that pharmacists and manufacturers would
still be subject to liability for negligence, so long as there were facts to support such a claim.
Id. 1134,37.
Also, PCMC fails to recognize that even if the "learned intermediary doctrine"
could be applied to exempt the conduct of PCMC's employees, PCMC would still be subject
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to liability because, as set forth above, Dr. Witte was PCMC's agent, if not its employee.
Under the law, her conduct is the conduct of PCMC.

POINT V
DR. GOLDENRING'S CAUSATION TESTIMONY IS NOT
SPECULATIVE.
Causation in the case is established through Dr. Goldenring's opinion that
Derek died as a result of Defendants' breaches of the standard of care in attaching Derek to
the sales model. Unfortunately, Defendants ignore Dr. Goldenring's plain and material
testimony of causation, and, instead, embark on an irrelevant and speculative discussion
about what might have happened had Defendants adhered to the standard of care. Thus,
Defendants state, "When questioned about his causation opinion, Dr. Goldenring agreed that
it would be speculative to say what Derek's outcome would have been absent the ventilator
failure." Defendant University's brief p. 38. Obviously, Derek's future, had Defendants
complied with the standard of care, is unknown. He could have lived eight days, eight
weeks, or eighty years. Dr. Witte, just like Dr. Goldenring, acknowledged as much,
Q:

Okay. So he could have lived weeks?

A:

I think if he was going to die it probably would have been well, I just can't say. He could have gotten better or got worse.
I just can't say when he would have died.

R. 1265, 124:20-24.
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